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Chapter 1
Introduction
Electronic health record (EHR) systems can improve the quality of patient care, safety
and education, while reducing costs and enabling research [1]. To encourage the adoption
and use of EHR systems by healthcare providers, the US government passed the Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 [2] and
established incentives for healthcare providers that demonstrate meaningful use of EHR
system to provide better patient care [3]. As a result, integration of EHR systems into
healthcare organizations (HCOs) has continually increased. However, the increased acces-
sibility of protected health information (PHI) in EHR systems leads to a greater potential
for misuse and abuse by the authorized users. Such events can result in penalties levied by
federal and state regulators.
An EHR is fundamentally a collaborative information system, which, traditionally, is
protected through proactive strategies, such as fine-grained access control technologies [4].
Such technology is often integrated into EHR systems; however, the dynamics of patient
care, in combination with the difficulty in predicting who needs access to a patient’s med-
ical record when, make it challenging to deploy such fine-grained control schema without
triggering a substantial quantity of false alerts and slowing care workflows [5]. Despite ac-
knowledging the potential for insider threats, HCOs typically do not instantiate fine-grained
controls [6]. This implicitly suggests that HCOs deem the losses associated with impacts
on workflow and care to be greater than those brought about by employees who misuse or
abuse their privileges.
Still, HCOs do not neglect insider threats entirely. In lieu of fine-grained proactive
protections, HCOs tend to rely upon retrospective mechanisms, such as auditing and inves-
tigation. In the United States, the Security Rule of the Health Information Portability and
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Accountability of 1996 (HIPAA) requires that all HCOs maintain audit logs, analyze them
for inappropriate use and report misuse [7]. Hospitals maintain audit log of all accesses to
PHI and the audit log is often reviewed by administrative officers to detect inappropriate
access. However, the sheer volume of accesses documented by large HCOs makes manual
review infeasible. The number of access transactions is often over one million per day [8],
while officers have only one or two people at their disposal (often allocating only a portion
of their time) to run investigations. As a result, many HCOs prioritize their investigations
by monitoring patient records deemed to be very important persons (VIPs) [9] or upon pa-
tient complaints [10]. In the latter scenario, compliance officers investigate the accesses to
patient records after a complaint has been registered.
More recently, there has been a push to (semi-)automate the auditing process. However,
there are many challenges an HCO faces to do so. For instance, the information often
required to determine if an access is inappropriate is not stored in the audit log [11], [12].
As a consequence, HCOs have deployed rule-based methods [10], [13] to capture high-
risk behavior and promote them to compliance officers for review. Figure 1.1 shows the
process associated with such a traditional rules-based auditing system. Unfortunately, rule-
based flagging systems can result in high false positives [9]. For example, a typical rule
is to flag when an employee accesses an EHR of a patient with the same last name. Yet,
for individuals with a common name, clearly this rule will trigger an excessive amount of
alerts.
Given the state of affairs, we set out to, assess the validity of rules for auditing accesses
made in EHR systems. Our goal is to test, through simulation and theoretical analyses, if
these flags occur at a higher rate than expected, and therefore serve as a valid means to
detect inappropriate behavior. In order to achieve this goal, we solve three sub-problems
that are listed below.
1. Investigate the difference between observed and expected high-risk accesses. We
introduce an approach to investigate the difference between the observed and ex-
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log
Flagged Accesses
Manual Review
True Positive
False Positive
Accesses Not Flagged
No review
Rules
Last name
Co-worker
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Pre-defined flag criteria specified by Privacy Officers as 
High-Risk behavior.
Figure 1.1: The process by which an HCO investigates accesses to EHRs deemed to be of
high-risk.
pected rate of high-risk accesses in EHR systems for typical expert-specified rules.
If a rule holds merit, we anticipate that the observed rate of high-risk accesses will
be higher than the expected rate of high-risk accesses to the EHR system. Using
one week of data from Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC), we show that
there are many rules for which this difference is statistically significant.
2. Select and prioritize rules based on deviation between observed and expected.
We introduce an approach for selection and prioritization of the high-risk rules. This
approach is based on the magnitude of the deviation between the observed and ex-
pected frequency of high-risk accesses for each rule.
3. Prioritize flagged high-risk accesses for investigation. To improve the manageabil-
ity of a manual review process in resource constrained environments, explanation-
based filtering [10] can be utilized to prioritize the flagged accesses for manual
review. Note that rule-based flagging and explanation-based filtering are comple-
mentary approaches to detect inappropriate behavior. While rules capture the high-
risk behavior, explanations reduce the set of accesses that need to be investigated
to a set of un-explained accesses. We find synergy between these two auditing ap-
proaches and introduce an explanation-based mechanism to prioritize high-risk ac-
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cesses flagged by rules for manual investigation. We show that many, though not all,
of the high-risk accesses can be explained away with clinically justifiable reasons.
Challenge: 
Prompt Detection 
of Insider Misuse 
Approach 2
Approach 1
Rule-Based 
Auditing
Effectiveness 
in practice?
We use statistical methods, 
such as chi-square test to 
evaluate effectiveness of rules.
Data-Driven
Auditing
Use Patient Encounter 
and diagnoses information
Build Supervised Machine 
Learning Model that predicts 
probability of access to patient 
EHR
Oblivious to Statistical 
Properties of EHR data
Limitation
To overcome this limitation Flagging and Ranking 
Suspicious Accesses 
for review
Leading To
Figure 1.2: Summary of challenges, approaches and contributions in this work.
Despite its potential, rule-based auditing system is inherently limited by its reliance
on predefined rules, which themselves are often based on domain expertise. However, in
practice, there are many possible reasons for inappropriate access. As a result, the access
coverage (i.e., proportion of accesses effectively monitored by high-risk rules) is low. An-
other limitation of rule-based auditing system is that the rule-based flagging of high-risk
accesses is dependent on the correctness and completeness of EHR data. Incorrect EHR
data (e.g., the wrong patient’s last name is entered into the EHR system) leads to gaps in
identifying a potential high-risk access. Similarly, an incomplete address or a P.O. Box
would lead to gaps in flagging a potentially high-risk access according to the Residential
Proximity or Residential Street rule.
To this end, we propose an automated suspicious access detection system which can
overcome above mentioned limitations of rule based auditing system. We hypothesize that
the department from which an employee will access a patient’s EHR and the time of this ac-
cess depends upon the patient’s clinical encounter times and diagnosis. We believe that the
patient clinical encounter and diagnosis information can be used to predict which hospital
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department’s employee will access patient’s EHR and when will the access occur. We pro-
pose an automated suspicious access detection system based on supervised machine learn-
ing technique that learns access patterns of various hospital departments using the audit
log of accesses and corresponding patient’s clinical encounters and diagnosis. This system
predicts the probability of access of a patient’s record on a given date by an employee of a
given hospital department. The value of probability of occurrence for each access can be
used to identify suspicious accesses in the audit log, which according to the system are the
accesses predicted to have zero/low probability of occurrence. This automated suspicious
access detection process can reduce the time and manual effort in identifying suspicious
accesses to EHR. The suspicious accesses detected by our system can be investigated by
administrative officers to identify if the suspicious access is in fact an inappropriate access.
This fast detection of insider misuse can reduce further harm to the sensitive patient health
information. Figure 1.2 summarizes challenges, approaches and contributions in this work.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we first provide an overview of the different frameworks and techniques
we utilize in this thesis. Next, we review works related to the Electronic Health Record
(EHR) auditing systems.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Supervised Machine Learning
Machine learning is the process of analyzing the data by establishing the relationship
between multiple features in the data to solve various problems including classification,
prediction etc. Machine learning algorithms are classified into supervised and unsupervised
algorithms. A supervised machine learning algorithm learns from a dataset of training
instances that are represented using same set of features with known associated labels. It
applies the learned relationships to predict labels for future new instances of data [14]. For
example, given a training set of patient disease diagnoses mapped to a department that treats
the diseases, supervised machine learning learns from this dataset and builds a function to
best determine the department from the disease diagnoses. Then, given a set of disease
diagnoses withheld from the training dataset, the function will predict a department that
treats the diseases.
Random Forest Classifier. Random forest classifier is an ensemble learning algorithm
for building a predictor with a set of decision trees which grow in random subset of data
[15]. Random forest fits the set of decision tree classifiers on the various subsets and utilizes
averaging to achieve optimal predictive accuracy and controls over-fitting of data.
Classifier Performance. The performance of random classifier is evaluated using area
under the receiver operating characteristics curve (AUC ROC) metric [16]. ROC curve is a
6
graph of true positive rate vs false positive rate of a classifier.
2.2 Related Work
Various auditing strategies have been proposed to detect inappropriate insider accesses
in EHRs. Boxwala et al. have introduced an automation strategy based on statistical
and supervised machine-learning techniques to detect suspicious accesses to EHRs [9].
This strategy uses audit logs and EHR data to construct features to learn predictive mod-
els that rank suspicious and non-suspicious accesses according to their risk. The features
constructed in this technique are user-related, patient-related, record-access-events-related,
encounter-related, and user-patient-relationship-related. The encounter-related features in
this technique only cover Encounter location type and patient visits. Our technique focuses
on different types of encounters and encounter times. Also, their technique includes Patient
features based on patient type such as whether patient is VIP or patient is also an employee,
it does not use patient’s diagnosis for feature construction.
Recognizing that not all suspicious accesses are affiliated with a specific pattern, a vari-
ety of frameworks have been developed to detect anomalous accesses based on deviations
from expected behavior [17], [18].
Fabbri et al. have proposed notion of an explanation-based auditing system (EBAS)
considering that most accesses to EHRs occur for a valid clinical or operational reason.
EBAS works by filtering out accesses to the EHR according to explanations generated
automatically from the data by a mining algorithm [10]. EBAS is also equipped to explain
reasons for an access to EHR based on diagnosis information [19].
While all of these auditing strategies offer certain benefits over the simple rule-based
auditing system, currently approaches based on the latter are in common use by HCOs.
Hence, we first evaluate the effectiveness of the auditing rules in identifying inappropriate
accesses to EHR and propose methods to improve effective use of auditing rules. Rec-
ognizing the inherent limitations of auditing rules which lead to low access coverage, we
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propose an automated auditing system that utilizes patient clinical encounter and diagno-
sis information to automatically detect suspicious accesses to EHR, which has not been
investigated in the previous works on EHR auditing.
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Chapter 3
Flagging and Ranking Suspicious Accesses in Electronic Health Record Systems Using
Auditing Rules
Healthcare organizations (HCOs) often deploy rule-based auditing systems to detect
insider threats to sensitive patient health information in electronic health record (EHR)
systems. These rule-based systems define behavior deemed to be high-risk a priori (e.g.,
family member, co-worker access). While such rules seem logical, there has been little
scientific investigation into the effectiveness of these auditing rules in identifying inappro-
priate behavior. Thus, in this work, we introduce an approach to evaluate the effectiveness
of individual high-risk rules and rank them according to their potential risk. We investi-
gate the rate of high-risk access patterns and minimum rate of high-risk accesses that can
be explained with appropriate clinical reasons in a large EHR system. An analysis of 8M
accesses from one-week of data shows that specific high-risk flags occur more frequently
than theoretically expected and the rate at which accesses can be explained away with five
simple reasons is 16 - 43%.
3.1 Methodology
We hypothesize that a high-risk audit rule holds merit when the observed frequency
at which it fires is higher than what would occur due to routine daily behavior. To test
this hypothesis, we compare the observed frequency of high-risk accesses in a large EHR
audit log with what one might expect to observe at random. We apply a goodness of fit
test to determine if there is a significant difference between the observed and expected
frequencies. We further examine the observed high-risk accesses flagged by each rule to
determine the minimum rate in that these accesses can be explained with clinical reasons.
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3.1.1 Data overview
The data investigated in this study is drawn from the VUMC EHR system. Table 3.1
depicts the data investigated in this study. These data are an integration of EHR audit log,
employee personal information, patient personal information (e.g., names, dates of birth,
and residential addresses) with information about the department for which the employee
is affiliated (e.g., the Anesthesiology department).
Table 3.1: Summary of the VUMC data used in this investigation.
Total Accesses 7.5M
Repeat Accesses 6.9M
Self-Accesses 21K
Unique Non-Self Accesses (LEP ) 710K
Unique Employees (E) 13K
Unique Patients (P) 152K
Unique Departments 2.1K
We designate an access as a Self-access when the employee has accessed his/her own
record. We assume this occurs when the first name, last name and date of birth of the
employee and patient in the access are the same. We designate an access as a Repeat
access when the employee accesses the record of the same patient earlier in the week. All
of the accesses except the first access are considered as Repeat accesses.
3.1.2 Types of high-risk behavior
While there are many types of high-risk behavior, we selected the following types for
our experiments through background analysis. Specifically, we investigate five high-risk
rules in this study:
1. Co-Worker: The EHR user and patient are both employees of the VUMC.
2. Department Co-Worker: The EHR user and patient work in the same VUMC de-
partment.
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3. Last Name: The EHR user and patient have the same last name.
4. Geographic Proximity: The EHR user lives within 0.25 miles of the patient.
5. Residential Street: The EHR user lives on the same street as the patient. In addition,
we added one rule to ascertain if the results of our experiments are merely an artifact
of the data or if they are indicative of suspicious behavior:
6. First Name: The EHR user and patient have the same first name.
3.1.3 Method overview
In this section, we provide an overview of the method to test our hypothesis and to
determine the minimum rate of high-risk accesses explained with a clinical reason, as de-
picted in Figure 3.1.
The steps in this method are defined broadly as follows:
1. Determine the observed frequency of the high-risk accesses.
2. Determine the expected frequency of high-risk accesses by:
(a) Using simulations with random samples of users and patients.
(b) Using simulations with permutations of users and patients.
(c) Using a theoretical formulation.
3. Compare the observed frequency of high-risk accesses to the expected frequency
of high-risk accesses, and determine the significance of the deviation between the
observed and expected frequency.
4. Use the explanation-based method to identify the observed high-risk accesses that
can be explained with clinical reasons, and determine the minimum rate that observed
high-risk accesses can be explained.
11
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Figure 3.1: The steps to compute the observed and expected frequencies of high-risk ac-
cesses, and the minimum rates that high-risk accesses can be explained.
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3.1.4 Observed and expected frequencies of high-risk accesses
E1 P1
E2 P2
E3 P3
E4 P4
E5 P5
E3 P3
E4 P4
E1 P1
E3 P1
E4 P3
E1 P4
E4 P3
E2 P4
E3 P1
Audit Log Simulated Accesses
Simulated Accesses 
Permute Patients
Permute Employees
Random Sample
E2
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P1 E2 P3
E5 P4
E3 P1
Employee List (E)
Patient List (P)
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E1
E2
E3
E4
E5
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
Random Sample
Random Sample
Employee-Patient
Pairing
Observed 
Accesses (S)
Employee 
Sample (SE)
Patient 
Sample (SP)
Figure 3.2: An overview of the process for sampling the observed accesses and simulation
of the expected accesses.
Figure 3.2 depicts the method to obtain the observed accesses by sampling the audit log
and simulation of the expected accesses using permutation and random sampling methods.
We explain these methods in detail in the following sections.
Observed. We obtain the observed frequency of high-risk accesses empirically from
the set of unique employee-patient pairs LEP, where E is the list of employees (or users) and
P is the list of patients in the employee-patient access pairs LEP. These pairs are obtained
from the 710,000 unique accesses in the audit log and are devoid of any self-access. We
select a random sample S of 100,000 pairs from LEP, each of which is assessed for the
high-risk criteria. We count the occurrence of the high-risk accesses across the sample and
calculate the frequency of the high-risk accesses in the sample as: |high-risk accesses| / |S|.
Expected. To simulate accesses and obtain an expected frequency distribution of high-
risk behaviors we apply both permutation and random sampling methods. We use two
distinct methods to confirm these simulation methods do not result in selection bias and
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that the sample selected by our methods are representative of the population. We compare
the results of the simulations to verify if the results lead to the same conclusion.
Expected: Permutation. In this approach, we construct simulated accesses by shuf-
fling the data points in S. We use two types of permutation methods to simulate accesses and
verify that results of both the methods lead to the same conclusion. 1) Permute Patients:
This method shuffles the list of patients while holding the list of employees in sample S
constant. 2) Permute Employees: This method shuffles the list of employees while fixing
the list of patients in sample S.
Expected: Random Sampling. We obtain the employee list E and the patient list P
from the set of employee-patient pairs LEP. Next, we select a random sample of 100,000
employees SE and 100,000 patients SP (without replacement) from E and P, respectively.
We then construct simulated accesses by randomly matching the records in SE and SP.
For each simulation, we calculate the frequency of high-risk accesses in sample S.
Expected: Theoretical Formulation. The expected frequency of high-risk accesses
is computed empirically, using the probabilities of high-risk accesses occurring among the
employees and patients in sample S. We determine the expected frequency for five of the
six rules presented above.
The expected frequency of the high-risk accesses using probabilities is computed as
∑|x|i=1PEiPPti, where, PEi = |Employee with attribute value x| / |SE|, PPti = |Patient with
attribute value x| / |SP|, attributes: [last name, first name, residential street name, work
department name] and SE and SP are the lists of employees and patients in S, respectively.
Experimental Evaluation. We run 10 experiments each for the randomization and per-
mutation methods to compute the observed and expected frequencies of high-risk accesses.
We compute the ratio of the mean observed frequency to mean expected frequency for each
of the high-risk rules. We also compute the percentage of observed and expected high-risk
accesses for each high-risk type to determine the rate of observed and expected high-risk
accesses.
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Minimum rate of high-risk accesses explained. While there are many operational
and clinical reasons that can explain the reason for accesses in an EHR, we select pri-
mary treatment, payment and healthcare operations (TPO) [20] to ascertain the extent to
which high-risk accesses can be explained. We specifically focus on explanations in the
form of 1) scheduled appointments, 2) ordered lab results, 3) ordered medications, 4) ad-
mission, discharge, and transfer events, and 5) clinical documentation. A high-risk access
can have multiple explanations (e.g., patient had a scheduled appointment with the access-
ing employee, and patient also had a lab order with the accessing employee). We use the
explanation-based approach to prioritize the observed high-risk accesses for further inves-
tigation by administrative officers, with unexplained accesses considered as high priority
for the investigation. The explained accesses can be ranked using the type and number of
explanations available for the access.
Since we do not exhaust the list of possible reasons, we compute the minimum rate
at which high-risk accesses can be explained for each high-risk rule. Additional plausible
explanations for the access exist (e.g., user performed surgery on the patient) and could be
invoked to raise the rate.
Goodness of fit chi-square test. We apply a χ2 test to determine the goodness of fit
between the observed (empirical) and expected (simulated) number of occurrences of high-
risk accesses. This test is designed to ascertain if there is a significant difference, such that
these deviations are likely not the result of chance alone. The measure of goodness of fit is:
χ2 =
n
∑
i=1
(Oi−Ei)2
Ei
,
where Oi and Ei are the observed and expected high-risk event frequencies of type i, re-
spectively.
We test this value against a χ2 distribution with 1 degree of freedom. This is because
there are two categories: 1) High-risk accesses, 2) Non-high-risk accesses. We perform
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this test at the 0.01 significance level (i.e., we accept the alternative hypothesis when the
value result is below this level).
3.2 Results
In this section, we summarize the deviation of the observed from the expected high-
risk access rates obtained by four methods 1) Permute Patients, 2) Permute Employees, 3)
Random Sampling and 4) Theoretical formulation, for each high-risk access rule. We begin
by presenting the rate of observed and expected high-risk accesses. Next, we summarize
the minimum explanation rate for the high-risk accesses. Finally, we report the statistical
significance of the deviation between the observed and expected high-risk access rates.
3.2.1 Observed versus expected frequencies of high-risk access.
Table 3.2 summarizes the observed to expected frequency ratios for the various high-
risk access rules. It was found that the ratio of observed to expected frequencies varies
from 0.99 to 4.33 for the high-risk behavior rules. The observed frequency of the high-risk
accesses is higher than the expected frequency for all the high-risk rules except for the
HCO Co-Worker rule, which is approximately 1 (at 0.99).
Table 3.2: Observed to expected frequency ratio for the high-risk access rules.
Observed / Expected
High-Risk Rule Permute Patients Permute Employees Random Sampling Theoretical
HCO Co-Worker 1 1 0.99 1
First Name 1.17 1.17 1.15 1.12
Last Name 1.53 1.5 1.54 1.72
Geographic Proximity 2.51 2.34 2.54 Not computed
Residential Street 4.04 4.22 4.33 3.8
Department Co-Worker 3.22 3.14 3.25 2.41
As expected, the ratio of observed to expected frequencies for the First Name high-
risk class ranges from 1.12 to 1.17 for the four methods, suggesting there is no significant
deviation between the observed and expected frequencies for this rule.
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While the Geographic Proximity rule identifies if the patient and employee live within
a fixed distance (0.25 miles), the Residential Street rule identifies if the patient and user
live on the same street. Limiting the high-risk criteria to street name results in the higher
ratio of observed to expected for the Residential Street rule than the ratio of observed to
expected for Geographic Proximity rule.
Table 3.3: The observed versus expected percentage for the high-risk access rules.
High-Risk Rule Observed ExpectedPermute Patients Permute Employees Random Sampling Theoretical
HCO Co-Worker 3.84% 3.84% 3.84% 3.86% 3.84%
First Name 0.25% 0.21% 0.21% 0.21% 0.22%
Last Name 0.14% 0.09% 0.09% 0.09% 0.08%
Geographic Proximity 0.16% 0.07% 0.07% 0.07% Not computed
Residential Street 0.12% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03%
Department Co-Worker 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
Table 3.3 shows the percentage of observed and expected high-risk accesses for each
high-risk type in a sample of 100,000 accesses. The average percentage of observed high-
risk accesses ranged from 0.03% to 3.8%. Though the percentage of high-risk accesses for
HCO Co-Worker is higher than other types (by more than 3%), the observed frequency of
high-risk accesses does not deviate from the expected (see Table 2). This suggests that these
accesses can be assigned the lowest priority for investigation. The percentage of observed
and expected high-risk accesses for the rest of the high-risk rules is less than 1%, but given
that millions of accesses are committed per week, this small percentage yields non-trivial
numbers of high-risk accesses.
3.2.2 Minimum rate of high-risk access explained away.
Table 3.4 summarizes the average rate (over 10 experiments) at which the observed
high-risk accesses can be explained with clinical reasons. Notably, the selected set of
explanations accounted for less than 50% of the accesses.
Table 3.5 summarizes the distribution of the explanations per high-risk rule. The highest
number of high-risk accesses is explained with the Clinical documentation explanation
17
Table 3.4: The rate at which high-risk alerts would be explained away.
High-Risk Rule Observed Accesses Explained Away Standard deviation
HCO Co-Worker 38.78% 0.67
First Name 35.59% 2.54
Last Name 21.43% 2.88
Geographic Proximity 24.79% 3.13
Residential Street 16.11% 4.88
Department Co-Worker 43.90% 9.32
for all high-risk rules, with the percentage of accesses explained in the range of 15% to
43%. Scheduled Appointment explains 2% to 8% of the high-risk accesses. The other
four explanations explain less than 5% of the high-risk accesses for all high-risk rules. The
Clinical Documentation explanation shows high standard deviation (9.26) for the high-
risk rule Department Co-Worker because of two out-lier experiments with the highest and
lowest number of explained accesses, respectively.
Table 3.5: Distribution of explanations per high-risk rule (STD DEV = Standard deviation).
% Observed Accesses Explained Away
Scheduled Appointment Ordered Lab Ordered Medications (Admission, Discharge and Transfer) Clinical Documentation
High-Risk Rule % STD DEV % STD DEV % STD DEV % STD DEV % STD DEV
HCO Co-Worker 7.5 0.3 1.28 0.22 0.006 0.01 0.43 0.05 37.94 0.67
First Name 8.76 1.29 1.59 0.67 0 0 0.85 0.54 34.6 2.51
Last Name 2.23 1.01 0.43 0.37 0.22 0.35 0.22 0.35 20.69 3.15
Geographic Proximity 6.33 1.47 1.07 0.65 0 0 0.35 0.49 24.25 3.38
Residential Street 2.99 1.5 0.69 0.37 0 0 0.15 0.33 15.68 5.06
Department Co-Worker 8.26 4 1.4 2.02 0 0 1.1 1.43 43.6 9.26
3.2.3 Hypothesis test.
Table 3.6 shows the χ2 result for a sample S of 100,000 unique accesses that are de-
void of self-accesses. The expected number of accesses for this experiment was simulated
through the permutation method (i.e., shuffling the list of patients and keeping list of em-
ployee fixed in the observed accesses). It should be noted that we did not include the Co-
Worker rule in the χ2 test because the results showed that there was no difference between
the observed and expected accesses for this high-risk class.
The result of the χ2 for high-risk rules Last Name, Geographic Proximity, Residential
Street and Department Co-Worker indicated a probability < 0.0001. This is below the 0.01
significance level, such that we accept the alternative hypothesis for these high-risk rules
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(i.e., the difference between the observed and expected frequency of high-risk accesses
for these rules is statistically significant). The result of the χ2 for First Name indicated
a probability of 0.0113, which is above the 0.01 significance level, such that we reject the
alternative hypothesis (i.e., there is no significant difference between observed and expected
frequencies of high-risk accesses). This is notable because it suggests that our control rule
is functioning correctly.
Table 3.6: Results of the χ2 test for goodness of fit between the observed and expected
with one degree of freedom per experiment. * denotes: Significance at 0.01 level.
High-Risk Rule Observed Expected Chi-Square Probability
First Name 245 208
6.42 0.0113
Non-High-Risk 99755 99792
Last Name 140 91
25.87 <0.0001*Non-High-Risk 99860 99909
Geographic Proximity 166 66
150.1 <0.0001*Non-High-Risk 99834 99934
Residential Street 115 28
267.29 <0.0001*Non-High-Risk 99885 99972
Department Co-Worker 36 11
54.58 <0.0001*Non-High-Risk 99964 99989
3.3 Discussion
This study examined the extent to which high-risk EHR access rules are plausible in
practice. Our empirical investigation illustrates that the observed rate at which high-risk
rules are triggered is higher, at a statistically significant level, than what one would expect
at random for several typical classes of high-risk behavior. This significant deviation sug-
gests that there may be systematic EHR user behavior that requires further investigation,
implying those rules may hold merit. Still, not all rules deviate to the same degree. In this
respect, we further believe that the magnitude of the deviation of the observed frequency of
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high-risk accesses from their expected frequency obtained from each high-risk class may
be a plausible measure to assist in the prioritization of auditing rules in emerging game
theoretic frameworks [21].
1
Residential Street
37% of the accesses flagged by
the Geographical Proximity rule  
were not flagged by the 
Residential Street rule.
15% of the accesses flagged by 
the Residential Street rule were not flagged by 
the Geographical Proximity rule.
Geographic Proximity
Figure 3.3: Geographic Proximity and Residential Street rules yield different results.
Geographical Proximity and Residential Street rules are designed to capture the same
high-risk behavior (i.e. a user accessing records of a patient living in close geographic
vicinity of the user). However, these two rules yield different results in terms of number
of accesses flagged and the deviation of observed frequency from expected frequency of
flagged accesses. Notably, the user and patient in 15% of the accesses flagged by the Res-
idential Street rule do not live within 0.25 miles of each other, and the user and patient in
37% of the accesses flagged by the Geographical Proximity rule do not live on the same
residential street, as depicted in Figure 3.3. Also, the length of the streets in the city varies
from 0.4 miles to over 10 miles leading to a non-uniform application of the geographic
vicinity criteria. This result indicates that rule definitions play an important role in effec-
tively capturing high-risk behavior.
Despite their potential, high-risk access rules often have a high false positive rate. This
makes them prohibitively expensive for HCOs to systematically investigate, which is a
concern given the limited budgets available to privacy officers. However, we show that
high-risk access rules can be complemented through an explanation-based model, such
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that many accesses can be explained away by valid TPO reasons (16% to 44% depending
on the high-risk rule at minimum). We believe this is notable because it suggests that high-
risk rules and explanations are not correlated. Nonetheless, we believe that, in this setting,
the explanations can be used to prioritize high-risk accesses for manual investigation. The
unexplained accesses can be considered high priority for investigation, while the explained
accesses can be ranked using the type and number of explanations available for the access.
There are, however, several limitations of this study that we wish to highlight for future
investigations. First, an explanation-based system relies solely on the data stored in the
database to generate explanation for an access. Missing information (or non-documented
relationships) may result in few unexplained appropriate accesses. For example, EHR
systems maintain records of patient appointments with doctors, but they do not explicitly
record the relationship between the doctor and the nurse working together at the appoint-
ment. Thus, the system cannot readily explain the access of patient’s record by the nurse
working with the doctor, though the access in this case is appropriate. Other research has
posited enhancing explanations with additional data learned from diagnosis information
[19]. Second, in this study we only consider simple high-risk rules. In a future investiga-
tion, we plan to study more complex and nested high-risk rules. Fourth, this study suggests
that different high-risk rules yield different results, but does not investigate the reasons for
the differences.
3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we examined the rate of high-risk access rules in the electronic health
record of a large healthcare organization. Specifically, we compared the observed and
expected rates to ascertain the extent to which such rules are potentially useful in practice.
The primary finding of this investigation was that such rules appear to detect behaviors that
are statistically significantly different than what would transpire under random activities.
There are many reasons why such deviation might transpire, but our investigation shows
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that such rules should not be dismissed.
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Chapter 4
Flagging and Ranking Suspicious Accesses in Electronic Health Record Systems Using
Machine Learning Based Prediction Methods
Hospitals are facing steep challenges to protect patient data in EHR from insider threat.
As per HIPAA Breach Notification Rule [22], hospitals are required to maintain an audit
log of accesses to EHR and report the breaches within a specified time frame. To detect
the breaches, the audit log is manually reviewed and investigated by the administrative
officers. However, given the high volume of accesses per day in large hospitals [8], it
may not be feasible to detect the breaches within the specified time frame. Hence, to
enable prompt detection of insider misuse, hospitals need automated inappropriate access
detection mechanisms.
During the course of care, a patient can have multiple clinical encounters, such as Ap-
pointment, Labs, etc. EHR system records information for each of these patient encounters
including the encounter date. When a hospital employee accesses a patient’s records, that
information is recorded in the audit log as an access along with the access date. An access
by an employee can occur on/before/after a patient’s encounter. For example, a surgeon ac-
cesses a patient’s records prior to the surgery encounter whereas a lab technician accesses
a patient’s records after the labs have been ordered by the physician. We observe that, the
patient encounter and audit log information can be utilized to identify suspicious accesses
to patient EHR. More specifically, encounter and access dates can be utilized to predict the
probability of access on a given date for the observed encounters. If the probability of ac-
cess is below a certain threshold and the access occurs, then the access can be automatically
flagged as a suspicious access.
We leverage supervised machine learning technique to build a prediction model that
utilizes a patient’s encounter and diagnosis information to predict the probability of access
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to patient’s EHR. We observe that, access patterns may vary significantly across different
hospital departments. Hence, we construct three different types of models for prediction:
1. Unique Model for Each Department: This model predicts the probability of access
of a patient’s EHR by employee of the given department on a given date,
2. Unique Model for Each Cluster of Departments: This model predicts the probability
of access of a patient’s EHR on a given date by employee of any department from
given cluster of departments and
3. Single Model for All Departments: This model predicts the probability of access of
a patient’s EHR on a given date by an employee who can belong to any department.
4.1 A Motivating Scenario
We hypothesize that the access pattern of a department is determined by patient’s spe-
cific encounter types and diagnoses. To test our hypothesis, we analyze the audit log of two
months from VUMC. We define a metric using access date and encounter date as (access
date - encounter date), to quantify how far apart an access occurs from an encounter. We
use the prior access and encounter information stored in the audit log to derive a distri-
bution for our metric. A large hospital like VUMC can have multiple departments. Each
department can exhibit a different pattern for patient accesses. Hence, we derive distribu-
tions for our metric in context of each department. Figure 4.1. shows the distribution of
our metric for four different departments. To further understand the statistical properties of
these distributions we harness skew and kurtosis.
Table 4.1. lists the statistics that describe the access distributions presented in Figure
4.1. Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of a probability distribution of a variable.
Zero skew value indicates that the distribution is symmetric about the mean whereas neg-
ative skew value indicates that the distribution is left tailed i.e. left tail of the distribution
is heavier than the right tail and a positive skew value means that the distribution is right
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Figure 4.1: Distribution of Metric (Access Date - Encounter Date) for Four Different De-
partments, Encounter Type = ANY.
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tailed [23]. We performed this statistical analysis for all the 1737 departments in our data
and we observe that the Skew values range from 0 to 9.89. It should be noted that all the
departments had distribution with positive skew value i.e. there were more accesses after a
clinical encounter compared to before the encounter for all departments.
Kurtosis is a measure of tailedness / peakedness of a distribution. A high value of kurto-
sis means the distribution has heavy tails compared to a normal distribution and a low value
of kurtosis means that the distribution has light tails compared to a normal distribution. We
observe that the kurtosis values for the departments in our dataset range from -3 to 99.02
which suggests that the tailedness varies for all department distributions. Out of the four
departments in the table 4.1, the Anticoagulation Clinic has a negative kurtosis value which
means it is lightly tailed and has flat peak, and Anesthesiology department has high value
of kurtosis which means it is heavily tailed and has a sharp peak.
Table 4.1: Statistics of Distribution of Metric (Access Date - Encounter Date) for Four
Different Departments, Encounter Type = ANY.
Department Minimum Maximum Mean Variance Skew Kurtosis
Anesthesiology 1 9212 480.03 1057367.45 5.93 43.62
Anticoagulation Clinic 5 2425 526.78 339468.04 0.98 -0.07
Liver Transplant Program 2 1038 153.12 31418.53 1.76 4.62
Nephrology 1 2752 273.5 151441.54 2.99 13.64
We perform similar analysis for all VUMC departments and the results enable us to
conclude that access patterns vary significantly across different departments.
A clinical encounter is further classified into different types including appointment, labs
etc. To assess whether the distribution of our metric for a department changes for different
encounter types, we evaluate the distribution of our metric for each encounter type. Figure
4.2 shows that the distribution for two different encounter types (anesthesiology-case and
appointment) of the Anesthesiology department are different. These results inform us that
the prediction model needs to be aware of encounter types.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Metric (Access Date - Encounter Date) for Anesthesiology
Department, Encounter Type: 1) Appointment, 2) Anesthesiology Case
4.2 Methodology
4.2.1 Data Overview
We perform experiments on the data from VUMC. Table 4.2. summarizes the statistics
of the data used in this study.
Table 4.2: Summary statistics of the data used in this study.
Patients Employee Departments Encounter Types ICD Chapters Access Dates Encounter Dates
433254 1737 54 21 2017/10/01-2017/11/30 2017/10/01-2017/11/30
Figure 4.3 depicts the relationships in our dataset. For each access, the Audit log
records, ID of the patient whose records are accessed, ID of the employee who made the
access and the time of access. The EHR stores information for each clinical encounter of
a patient by recording the encounter type and encounter time. EHR system also stores pa-
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tient diagnosis in terms of International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9)
and Tenth Revision (ICD-10) codes [24]. The ICD codes are mapped into 21 ICD chapters
depending on the subject of the ICD codes. To reduce the size of the feature matrix for pre-
diction models we use ICD chapters instead of ICD codes. In addition, the VUMC dataset
includes the list of departments each employee is affiliated with.
Audit Log
Patient ID Employee ID Access Time
Patient Information
Patient ID Encounter Information ICD Codes
Employee Information
Employee ID Department Affiliations
Patient Encounters Information
Encounter Type Encounter Time
ICD Code to ICD Mapping
ICD Code ICD Chapter
Figure 4.3: Input Data Integration.
4.2.2 Feature Extraction
We constructed features using our metric (access date - encounter date) for each en-
counter type and diagnosis information (ICD chapters). Table 4.3. depicts patient data
example.
Table 4.3: Patient Encounters and ICDs
Patient Appointment Labs ICD Chapters
P1 2017/10/04 NO 1
P3 2017/10/07 NO NO
P4 2017/10/07 2017/10/06 21
Features: Encounter Information. Our dataset includes 54 types of clinical encoun-
ters e.g. appointment, lab order (labs), medication order, anesthesiology case etc. For each
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patient in our data, we obtain the encounter-date i.e. when each patient had these encoun-
ters. We then obtain the absolute difference between access date and encounter date for
each of these encounters of the patient. If the patient had multiple occurrences of same
type of encounter we consider only the encounter date that is closest to the access date. For
the encounters that did not occur for a patient we default the value to 100.
Features: Diagnosis Information. The EHR system stores ICD codes for each pa-
tient. We obtain the ICD chapters for each patient by mapping these ICD-codes to ICD
chapters. If a patient has a ICD chapter assigned in EHR, the value is considered as 1 for
corresponding chapter in the feature matrix, else it is default to 100.
Feature Matrix. We construct feature matrix using the audit log (sample shown in Ta-
ble 4.4), the metric data (access date - encounter date) for 54 encounter types and diagnosis
(ICD chapter), for 433254 patients over two-month period as shown in Table 4.5.
This feature matrix covers following cases:
• Patients had clinical encounters and their EHR was accessed by hospital employees,
• Patients did not have any clinical encounters but their EHR was accessed by hospital
employees and
• Patients had clinical encounters but their EHR was not accessed by any hospital em-
ployee.
Table 4.4: Audit Log Sample
Patient Access Date Department of Employee in the Access
P1 2017/10/04 D1
P1 2017/10/05 D2
P3 2017/10/07 D3
P4 2017/10/04 D4
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Table 4.5: Feature matrix Sample
Patient Access Date Department of Employee in the Access Appointment Labs - ICD Chapter 1 - ICD Chapter 21
P1 2017/10/04 D1 0 100 - 1 - 100
P1 2017/10/05 D2 1 100 - 100 - 100
P3 2017/10/07 D3 0 100 - 100 - 100
P4 2017/10/04 D4 3 1 - 100 - 1
4.2.3 Classifier construction
We evaluate four classifiers including Random Forest Classifier (RFC), Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent, Gaussian Naive Bayes and Logistic Regression. The results show that RFC
performs better than the other models hence, we primarily include results of RFC in this
study (see section 4.3.1). Random forest is an ensemble learning approach for building a
predictor with a set of decision trees which grow in random subset of data [15]. Random
forest fits the set of decision tree classifiers on the various subsets and utilizes averaging to
achieve optimal predictive accuracy and controls over-fitting of data.
We build RFC using scikit-learn which is a python machine leaning library [25]. We
train and test the classifier on five-fold cross-validation. In a n-fold cross-validation the
dataset D is randomly split into n mutually exclusive subsets D1, D2, ...., Dn of same size
to ensure every sample in the dataset D has equal probability of appearing in the training
and test set [26]. The classification model is trained and tested n times with the training
data as D/Dt and tested with Dt, where t ε 1, 2, ...., n.
Model Types. We trained three separate models:
1. Unique Model for Each Department,
2. Unique Model for Each Cluster of Departments and
3. Single Model for All Departments.
The feature matrix remains same for all three models. The models differ in the output
matrix, the ‘Unique Model for Each Department’ predicts the probability of access of a
patient’s EHR by employee of the given department on a given date, ‘Unique Model for
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Employee ID, Department Affiliations Encounter Information, Disease Diagnosis 
Patient EHRAudit Log
Patient ID, Employee ID, Timestamp 
Employee Information
Feature Extraction
Data
Split into Training Data and Test Data for 5 Cross-Validations
Build Model
RandomForestClassifier (#Trees=10, Max Depth=10)
Test Model Predictions, Record AUC, 
Estimate Feature Importance
Training Set
Labeled Features
Test Set
Features Without Labels
Build Model with K Important Features
Evaluate Model Using AUC
Tune Hyper-Parameters,
Identify Best Model
Test Best Model, Record AUC
Test with Real and 
Simulated Accesses
Record AUC
Compare with Model 
with Only Real Accesses
Compare with Model 
with Default Parameters
Figure 4.4: Steps to Build and Evaluate Prediction Model
Each Cluster of Departments’ predicts the probability of access of a patient’s EHR on a
given date by employee of any department from given cluster of departments and ‘Single
Model for All Departments’ predicts the probability of access of a patient’s EHR on a given
date by an employee who can belong to any department. In this study, we used a prediction
time window of one day. In future, we would like to experiment with different time window
sizes. Table 4.6 depicts the output matrix for these models.
Table 4.6: Model Outcome Matrix
Unique Model for Each Department Unique Model for Each Cluster of Departments Single Model for All Departments
Patient Access Date Access by Department ‘Dn’ Access by Any Department in Cluster ‘Cn’ Access by Any Department
P1 2017/10/04 1 0 1
P1 2017/10/05 0 0 0
P3 2017/10/07 1 0 1
P4 2017/10/04 0 1 1
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Department Clustering. We use the Louvain method for community detection in large
networks to obtain department clusters [27]. Louvain method is a heuristic method based on
greedy network modularity optimization. Modularity of a network is measure of strength
of division of a network into modules/clusters/communities [28]. A network with dense
connections between the nodes within modules but sparse connections between nodes in
different modules has high modularity value. The data used for detection of department
communities is the list of patients accessed by each department.
4.2.4 Model Evaluation and Optimization
Area Under ROC Curve (AUC ROC). We use the average area under the receiver
operating characteristics curve (AUC ROC) of all cross-validations to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the classifier [16].
Feature Importance Evaluation, Build Model with Important Features. Impor-
tance of a feature in the input feature matrix with respect to the predictability of the target
variable is computed using the relative depth of the feature used as decision node in a tree.
Features that are used at the top of a decision tree contribute to the decision of a larger
fraction of input sample. The relative importance of each feature is measured using the
expected fraction of input samples they contribute to [25]. We estimate the importance of
each feature in the feature matrix of the predictor. We rank the features according to their
importance level then, we identify the importance level of 10th feature from the top and
select this importance value as a threshold importance level. We build a new model with
only the features having importance value equal or above this threshold importance level.
We compute the AUC ROC of the new predictor with these k important features, with five-
fold cross-validation. We then compare the AUC ROC of predictor with all features and
predictor with only k important features.
Model with Simulated Accesses. To determine if an access is an appropriate access or
an inappropriate access, needs manual investigation by privacy and administrative officers.
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Our dataset does not include this information about the accesses in the audit log and we
do not know if our dataset includes any true inappropriate accesses. Hence, to evaluate
the performance of our predictive models on audit log containing inappropriate accesses,
we mix real accesses with simulated accesses and test our models. We generate the sim-
ulated accesses by randomly pairing patient and department together. We assume that the
randomly generated accesses would not follow the access patterns expected by various hos-
pital departments. We train and test the predictor with mix of real and simulated accesses
and compare the performance of this model with performance of model built with only real
data.
Model Optimization. We perform hyper-parameter tuning on RFC using Hyperopt-
sklearn [29]. We obtain the best model and compute the AUC ROC using best model.
Figure 4.4 depicts the steps in our methodology.
4.3 Results and Discussion
4.3.1 AUC ROC
Table. 4.7 shows the AUC ROC values using different Machine Learning Algorithms
including RFC, Logistic Regression, Stochastic Gradient Descent and Gaussian Naive
Bayes. Results of this test show that, RFC performs better than all tested Machine Learning
Algorithms hence, we select RFC to build our prediction framework.
Table 4.7: AUC ROC Using RFC VS Other Machine Learning Algorithms
Single Model for All Departments Unique Model for Each Department
INTERNAL MEDICINE ANESTHESIOLOGY
Random Forest Classifier 0.81 0.79 0.87
Logistic Regression 0.52 0.67 0.83
Stochastic Gradient Descent 0.51 0.66 0.81
Gaussian Naive Bayes 0.51 0.64 0.75
Table 4.8. shows the average AUC ROC for the three different model types. Results
indicate that there is no clear winner. We observe that ‘Unique Model for Each Depart-
ment’ has a wide range for AUC ROC. Further investigation shows that, in general the
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departments that have very few accesses, have low model AUC ROC. ‘Unique Model for
Each Cluster of Departments’ provides the AUC ROC for an entire cluster of departments.
However, it is not clear what is the contribution of each department to overall AUC ROC
score. Similar concerns can be raised for ‘Single Model for All Departments’ which is a
specific case where all departments belong to a single cluster.
Table 4.8: AUC ROC for Each Type of Model
Model Type AUC ROC AVERAGE AUC ROC
Single Model for All Departments 0.78 0.78
Unique Model for Each Department 0.6 - 0.9 (No. of departments = 1737) 0.84
Unique Model for Each Cluster of Departments 0.77 - 0.87 (No. of clusters = 15) 0.8
4.3.2 Feature importance and AUC ROC with important features
In section 4.2.4, we describe our method to identify important features and reduce the
feature set size. Table 4.9 shows the top 5 important features of the example department
and cluster models. From the table, we see that the important features for each depart-
ment specific model are different. In addition, the important features (Encounter Type and
Disease codes) of the predictor are directly related to the department. Similar trend is ob-
served in cluster specific models. This confirms our hypothesis that the access pattern of a
department is determined by patient’s specific encounter types and diagnosis.
Table 4.9: Top Five Important Features Detected for Few Models
Model Type Top Five Important Features
Unique Model for Each Department
ANESTHESIOLOGY
Anesthesiology Case, ADT, Labs,
Documents History And Physical, Appointment
INTERNAL MEDICINE
Labs, Appointment, ADT,
Documents Clinical Communication,
Documents Medication Administration
Unique Model for Each Cluster of Departments
UROLOGY Cluster
Appointment,
ICD Chapter 14: ‘Diseases of the Genitourinary System’,
ICD Chapter 11: ‘Diseases of the Digestive System,
Complications Of Pregnancy, Childbirth, And The Puerperium’,
Anesthesiology Case, Labs
OPHTHALMOLOGY, EYE CLINIC Cluster
ICD Chapter 7: ‘Diseases of the eye and adnexa,
Diseases Of The Circulatory System’,
Appointment, ICD Chapter 8: ‘Diseases of the ear and mastoid process,
Diseases Of The Respiratory System’,
Labs, Anesthesiology Case
ENT, AUDIOLOGY, ALLERGY Cluster
Appointment, Labs,
ICD Chapter 10: ‘Diseases of the respiratory system,
Diseases Of The Genitourinary,System’,
Anesthesiology Case, ADT
We compute the AUC ROC of the new model with only important features with five-
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Figure 4.5: AUC with All Features VS AUC with K Important Features
fold cross-validation. We observe that AUC ROC values of model built with only important
features exhibit minimal difference as compared to the AUC ROC values of model built
with all features as shown in Figure 4.5. We believe, in case of very large dataset model
with only important features can be used to reduce feature vector size while achieving
similar model accuracy as model with all features.
4.3.3 Real and Simulated Accesses
If we introduce x number of simulated accesses in each department model then the
performance of the model depends on the number of real accesses by that department as
seen in the table 4.10.
Table 4.10: AUC with Real and Simulated Accesses
Department Number of Real Accesses by Department AUC with Real Accesses Only AUC with Real + Simulated Accesses
INTERNAL MEDICINE 86816 0.67 0.67
ANESTHESIOLOGY 27573 0.78 0.76
DENTAL-VAV CLINIC 259 0.77 0.74
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4.3.4 Optimized Model Performance
We obtain the best parameters for the RFC using hyper-parameter tuning method. We
compute the AUC ROC using the RFC with optimized hyper-parameters. Table 4.11.
shows the results of the model optimization experiment. The results suggest that, in general
hyper-parameter tuning improves the performance of the prediction models.
Table 4.11: AUC ROC with Optimized Parameters VS AUC ROC with Default Parameters
Model Department No. of Accesses With Optimized RFC Without Optimization(RFC (n estimators=10, max depth=10))
Unique Model for Each Department
INTERNAL MEDICINE 86816 0.81 0.67
ANESTHESIOLOGY 27573 0.85 0.78
NEPHROLOGY 17813 0.84 0.84
Single Model for All Departments ALL 2108607 0.78 0.77
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a supervised machine learning framework to detect suspi-
cious accesses to sensitive patient health information. This framework uses patient clinical
encounter information and diagnosis information to predict which hospital department em-
ployee will access a patient’s EHR and when this access will occur. We empirically evaluate
our prediction models on two months of audit logs from VUMC EHR system. The average
AUC over different hospital departments in our dataset is 0.84. Results of our experiments
indicate; this automated identification of suspicious accesses can be utilized to significantly
reduce the manual effort in EHR auditing.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
Hospitals are facing steep challenges to protect the privacy of patient data in EHR from
insider threats. To achieve fast detection of insider misuse and reduce further harm, large
hospitals need automated suspicious access detection mechanisms. This work presents
fundamental results towards designing efficient automated suspicions access detection sys-
tems.
HCOs primarily use rule-based auditing to identify suspicious insider behavior. How-
ever, rule-based methods have several limitations. First, rule-based auditing systems have
not been evaluated empirically. Second, rule-based auditing systems rely on predefined
rules and are oblivious to the statistical properties of the EHR data. To this end, we pro-
pose a principled approach to evaluate the effectiveness of rule-based auditing methods in
identifying suspicious behavior. Then, we propose an auditing method based on supervised
machine learning techniques which utilizes clinical context of the accesses in the EHR data
to identify suspicious behavior. Our detailed contributions in this work are as follows:
• We examined the rate of high-risk access patterns and minimum rate of high-risk ac-
cesses that can be explained with appropriate clinical reasons in a large EHR system.
An analysis of 8M accesses from one-week of data from the VUMC shows that spe-
cific high-risk flags occur more frequently than theoretically expected and the rate at
which accesses can be explained away with five simple clinical reasons is 16 - 43%.
• We build a machine learning model to predict the probability of access of a patient’s
EHR by the specified department on the specified date based on the clinical encounter
and diagnosis information. To empirically evaluate our prediction models, we per-
form an analysis with two months of audit logs from VUMC EHR system. The av-
erage AUC over different hospital departments in our dataset is 0.84. Results of our
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analysis indicate; this automated identification of suspicious accesses can be utilized
to significantly reduce the manual effort in EHR auditing.
There are several limitations in our study which provide directions for future investiga-
tions. First, this study does not test if a flagged suspicious access is in fact an inappropriate
access. A flagged suspicious access needs to be investigated manually by a privacy officer
to determine if it is a true inappropriate access. However, this manual investigation is be-
yond the scope of this study. Second, this investigation focused on data from only a limited
time period (one week and two months) from a single medical center. As such, it will be
necessary to validate these findings with data from a broader time period and over other
healthcare organizations.
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